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ABSTRACT
Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource
markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect
information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilbria in output
paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions,
and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all
suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves
are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing
their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers'
costs differ, it is shown that equilbrium involves inefficient pro-
duction; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost
reserves.
On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources
Tracy R. Lewis and Richard Schmalensee
Considerable effort has been devoted to the theoretical analysis of the
effects of supply-side market structure on the pattern of exploitation of nonre-
newable resources. Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975), Stiglitz (1976), and Sweeney
(1977) have compared competitive and monopolistic exploitation policies, while
Salant (1976), Lewis and Schmalensee (1978, 1979), and Gilbert (1978) have consi-
dered markets in which a cartel faces price-taking buyers and competitive fringe
suppliers. But, aside from some remarks by Salant (1976, Appendix B) and some
preliminary analysis by Lewis and Schmalensee (1979, Section 4), no theoretical
analysis of oligopolistic market structures:seems to have- been done. This.
neglect can hardly be defended by arguing that such structures are of no empirical
importance.
The present essay describes some of the central properties of noncooperative
equilibria (described more fully below) in oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable
natural resources under simplifying assumptions. The stationary model analysed
here seems the most natural intertemporal extension of the standard static Cournot
model of oligopoly equilibrium: output level choice in the static framework is re-
placed here by choice of an output path over time. Neither the Cournot model nor
the noncooperative model of this paper can be defended as universally descriptive.
But both are tractable representations of oligopoly situations, both have at least
a degree of coherence and plausibility, and both may yield useful insights and in-
tuitions. Given the state of static oligopoly theory, we see no defensible, tract-
able alternative to the Cournot/Nash cooperative approach taken here, but we would
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not argue that this approach should be taken as the last word. In light of
these considerations, it may or may not be reassuring that the general message
of our analysis seems to be that natural analogs of many of the properties of
the static Cournot model hold in the dynamic situation considered here.
We begin by presenting our assumptions and notation, describing some gen-
eral properties of equilibria, and establishing the existence of equilibria.
Section II provides some comparative dynamic properties of equilibria in which
all sellers have the same costs. We show there, among other things, that in-
creases in the number of sellers or equalization of their reserve holdings (to-
tal reserves constant) tends to speed up resource use. Section III deals with
the case of unequal costs. Equilibria are characterized in somewhat more detail,
and it is shown that the industry equilibrium output path is produced inefficient-
ly. It is demonstrated by example that noncooperative equilibrium may entail
the exhaustion of high-cost deposits of a resource before low-cost deposits.
I. Existence and Properties of Equilibrium
In order to see with some clarity how different oligopoly structures inter-
act with the dynamics inherent in natural resource markets, we follow the papers
cited above and make the sort of simplifying assumptions common in the literature
begun by Hotelling (1931).2 First, exploration does not occur in the world of
this model, and all reserve stocks are known. There exist N "firms", which may
be ordinary firms, nations, cartels, or other resource owners, with firm i's re-
serves at time zero equal to Ii. Let I be the sum of the Ii. Second, each firm
i can extract its reserves (and transport them to market) at a constant unit cost
Ci > 0; there are neither depletion effects nor capacity constraints. Let qi(t)
be firm i's rate of production at time t, and let Q(t) be the sum of the qi(t).
Third, the model is partial equilibrium and stationary; consumers are passive
price-takers and their behavior can be summarized by the smooth inverse demand
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function P(t) = P[Q(t)], with P' < 0. There is a single, constant discount
rate, r. Following Salant (1976) and others, the inverse demand curve is as-
sumed to satisfy the following:
(D.1) P(O) = F, a finite constant greater than the largest of the Ci;
(D.2) Demand elasticity, E = -(1/P')(P/Q), is strictly decreasing in Q
(or increasing in P);
(D.3) There exists a price P such that P{l-[l/NE(P)]}equals the smallest
of the Ci.
The "choke price", F, may be thought of as determined by the cost and other pro-
perties of some sort of backstop, with demand declining smoothly to zero as the
price of the resource becomes high enough. If F does not exceed the largest of
the Ci, the set of firms must re-defined, since price can never rise above F.
Assumption (D.2) is sufficient-but not necessary for industry marginal revenue to be
declining in Q whenever it is positive; it is thus a strong convexity assumption.
Assumption (D.3) plays much the same role here as Salant's (1976) assumption of
a point of unit elasticity; it serves to rule out pathological and technically
troublesome behavior of P and E as Q becomes large. It is a bounding assumption
and is implied by the plausible assumption that demand is finite at zero price,
Finally, the nature of equilibrium must be clarified. We shall be concerned
with solutions to a noncooperative game with full information, in which each firm
chooses its time-path of output, qi(t), to maximize its net wealth subject to the
reserve constraint, taking as fixed the output plans of all other producers, An
equilibrium exists when no qi(t) can profitably be changed. The presumption of
noncooperative behavior is strong, as is the assumption that firms know each other's
output paths in advance. The latter comes close to the assumption of complete
futures markets.3 This sort of equilibrium has been explored widely enough in
the natural resources context and elsewhere, however, to make our application of
it here of some interest, if not to establish its decriptive value.
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Under these assumptions, we can partially characterize an equilibrium
reasonably simply, relying on the fact that each firm basically faces a rela-
tively simple constrained maximization problem. Let a(P) = -dP/dQ, the absolute
value of the slope of the market demand curve. Then at euilibrium there must
exist a set of constants, Xi, and functions, qi(t), such that for i = 1,..,N
and t > 0,
(la) ert {P(t) - qi(t)a[P(t)] - Ci} = X, if qi(t) > O;
-rt
(lb) e {P(t) - Ci} < Xi', if qi(t) = 0
(c). > 0; I > qi(t)dt; Xi[Ii-7 qi(t)dt] = 0;
where P(t) satisfies the demand constraint.
The second inequality in (lc) is the reserve constraint. The left-hand
side of (la) is the discounted net marginal revenue of firm i hen qi(t) is posi-
tive and the other firms' outputs are taken as fixed, Demand assumption (D.2)
implies that this is a decreasing function of qi(t), all else constant. It then
follows from first principles that unless firm i's discounted net marginal reven-
ue is equal at each instant when it is producing (and non-negative at all such
instants) wealth can be increased by redistributing total production over time
(or by reducing total production). The constant Xi is then the marginal value,
in units of wealth at time zero, of additional reserves. Condition (lb) simply
says that if any firm rationally elects not to produce at any instant, dis-
cotAed. t rgnal.eyenue at that instant .with q = 0 cahnt exceed
discounted net marginal revenue at times when production optimally occurs, The
third part of condition (lc) is a standard complementary slackness statement:
reserves will be exhausted unless the marginal value of additional reserves is
zero.
Suppose that at some instant m firms are producing, with 1 < m < N. Differ-
11
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entiation of (la) totally with respect to time and addition across producing firms
yields an equation employed frequently in what follows:4
(2) rrP(mE-l) - C(mE)]
E[ (m+l) -Qa' ]
where C is the average of the Ci for producing firms. The assumption that E rises
with P can be seen to imply
(3) Qa' < (E+1)/E
from which it follows that the denominator on the right of (2) is positive as long
as Em > 1. For given P, P is easily seen to be decreasing in C and increasing in
m.
Using assumptions that resemble (ii) and (iii) above, Frank and Quandt (1963)
establish the existence of equilibrium in a static Cournot oligopoly model. The
work of Roberts and Sonnenshein (1976) indicates that assumptions of this sort
are almost necessary for existence, in the sense that equilibria apparently exist
only by chance or in very special cases if they are violated. Since our model
is related to the Cournot model studied by these authors, worries about non-exis-
tence of equilbria would seem to have more than usual force here, If our assump-
tion did not suffice to establish existence, one might suspect them of either in-
consistency or incompleteness. If equilibria cannot be shown to exist, it is hard
to take the study of their properties very seriously.
As it happens, the assumptions made above suffice to ensure existence. Let
T be the time at which all production of the resource ceases, Then the Appendix
establishes5
Proposition 1 A noncooperative equilibrium satisfying conditions
(1) exists and involves (a) Q(t) > 0 for O <t < T, (b) X i > 0
for i = 1,.,,,N, (c) T finite, (d) Ii = q(t) dt for i = 1,(e) (t) continuous for < t <T and (f) P(t) P for t T...,N,
(e) P(t) continuous for 0 < t <T, and (f) P(t) > P for 0 < t < T.
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From part (a) of the Proposition, some firms are operating at all times,
Adding condition (la) across the operating firms, the numerator on the right of
(2) is seen to equal rmXEe r, where D is the average of the Xi of the m operating
firms. By (b) of Proposition 1, this means that the numerator on the right of
(2) is always positive. This in turn directly implies that mE > 1 at all times,
which along with (3) implies.that the denominator on the right of (2) is positive
also. Thus P is always strictly increasing. Price starts out at some level not
below P and rises continuously and monotonically until it reaches F in finite time,
whereupon demand and the resource market vanish forever as the last remaining re-
serves are exhausted. Total output is positive and decreasing at all time, and
it follows from (e) of Proposition 1 that Q(t) declines smoothly to zero as t
approaches T.
Let us define market marginal revenue in the usual fashion:
(4) MR = P - aQ.
The arguments of the preceding paragraphs, along with (la), (2), and (3), above,
then serve to establish
Proposition 2 In equilibrium,
(a) 0 < P < r(P-C), with strict inequality for finite m, and
(b) MR > r(MR-C), with strict inequality for m > 1.
Hotelling (1931) established that (price - marginal cost) grows at the rate of
interest under competition in models of this sort, while (marginal revenue - mar-
ginal cost) grows at the same rate under monopoly. Proposition 2 indicates, as
one might expect, that noncooperative oligopoly equilibria are intermediate be-
tween these polar ases on this dimension.
II, Equal Costs
In this Section, we make the simplifying assumption that Ci = C for all i.
Proposition 2 implies that (P-C) is always growing at a rate less than r in this
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case. This, along with conditions (la) and (lb) imply that all firms with posi-
tive reserves will produce at time zero; as long as net marginal revenue when
q = O,(P-C), grows at a rate less than the rate of interest, so that discounted
net marginal revenue declines, it does not pay to postpone the start of production.
On the other hand some firms may exhaust their reserves and cease producing be-
fore P reaches F. From these remarks and Proposition 1, it follows that equili-
brium in the equal costs case can be characterized by a set of positive, finite
exhaustion times {Ti.} and shadow values of reserves {Xi.} such that for i = 1,...,N,
-rt(5a) e {P(t) - qi(t)a[P(t)] - C} = i 0 t < Ti,
(5b) qi(t) = O, t > i'
(5c) f qi(t)dt= i.
0
From Proposition 1, P(t) is continuous. It is then immediate that for (Sa)
and (5b) to hold, the qi(t) must also be continuous at all times. If not, some
firm's net marginal revenue would change discontinuously at some instant, and this
cannot happen in equilibrium. (Such changes imply the desirability of shifting pro-
duction either before or after the discontinuity until the jump is eliminated.) Each
of the q(t) must thus decline smoothly to zero as t approaches Ti.
It follows from (5a) that if firms i and j are producing at any instant
and if ki < XA, then qi > q This holds even in the limit as qj + 0, so it must
be that Ti > T. But it is then clear that firm i's total production exceeds firm
j's, so that Ii > I. If firms have unequal reserves, it must be that the firm
with the larger reserves has the smaller value of X, produces more at each instant,
and exhausts later.6 The first of these suggests that firms with smaller reserves
have greater exploration incentives, all else equal,
The preceding paragraph also indicates that if I = I/N for all i, it must
be that Xi = X for all i. If firms have equal reserves in addition to equal costs,
equilibrium is thus unique and is described by (5) with all i subscripts removed.7
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For this symmetric case, a large number of comparative dynamic results can be
established:
Proposition 3 If Ci = C and i = I/N for i = 1,...,N, the
noncooperative equilibrium is unique. Holding I constant,
increases in N (a) increase P(P), (b) lower T, (c) reduce
price at every level of reserves encountered, thus lowering
P(O) and leading to more rapid resource use, (d) raise , the
marginal value of reserves to each firm, (e) lower the pre-
sent value of total industry profits, and (f) raise discounted
producers' plus consumers' surplus.
These comparative dynamic results are established in Lewis and Schmalensee (1979,
Sect. 4) for the case C = 0, and only trivial modificaitons are required to gen-
eralize that proof.8 In the symmetric case, Proposition 3 indicates that increases
in N tend to make the market more nearly competitive, as in the standard static
Cournot model. Increases in N serve to speed up resource use, in the sense that
the total time to exhaustion is reduced and total production is larger at any level
of reserves. The latter assertion follows directly form a proof that with I con-
stant, increases in N lower the initial price. Because reserves are drawn down
faster with more firms, though, such increases will always make the price higher
than it otherwise would have been at some future times. Part (d) of Proposition 3
indicates that more intense rivalry, even though it reduces prices and profits,
may enhance exploration incentives. Parts (e) and (f) of that Proposition support
the standard intuition that when rivalry intensifies, consumers' gains outweight
producers' losses.
We now want to consider the implications of unequal reserves, still assuming
cost equality. Let PS(t) and T be the price path and exhaustion time, respective-
ly, in the symmetric case. Consider another market with the same demand curve
and the same values of r, C, , and N, but in which Ii Ij for some i and j.
Let the price path and exhaustion date in this asymmetric case be P (t) and Ta ,
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respectively. We now show that P S(0O) < pa (0) and T < Ta .
From the discussion above, Ti # Tj in the asymmetric case, so that the
number of firms operating decreases over time; an instant before Ta, fewer than
N firms are operating, In contrast, all N firms operate until T in the symme-
tric case. Let T be the time at which the first firm (the one with the smallest
1
of the I) runs out of reserves in the asymmetric case.
S(O) > a Sin a
Suppose PS(O) > pa(O) Since the motion of price until time T1 in both cases
is given by equation (2) with m = N and C = C, it must be that PS(Ta) > Pa(T). But
after T, fewer firms are operating in the asymmetric case, so that equation (2)
implies PS(P) > a(P) for all relevant values of P. (Recall that the right-hand
side of (2) is increasing in m, all else fixed,) It follows that P(t) > pa(t)
for all t > T. Since a(Ta) = P (Ts) = F and prices are monotone increasing,
Ts < Ta. But this implies that total production in the asymmetric case exceeds
that in the symmetric case and this is impossible. The supposition at the start
of the paragraph must therefore be false. Thus PS(0) < pa(O). If the price paths
never cross, equality of total produciton will be violated. It follows from the
arguments just above that they can only cross after T1 and that they can only cross
once. After the crossing, P S(t) > pa(t), so that Ts < Ta, as was to be shown. We
have thus completed the proof of
Proposition 4 If C = C for i = 1,...,N, and I. > I. fori 3. 3
some i and , then (a) firm i produces more at each instant
than firm j and ceases production later, and (b) P(O)
Aid T ar:- -gfeater than if the Ii were all equal, so that
resource use is less rapid.
There are many measures of concentration in the industrial organization lit-
erature, the most appealing of which have the property that they increase as the
10
number of firms falls and as some measure of the inequality of firm sizes rises.
Propositions 3 and 4 taken together indicate that if firm size is defined as total
reserves, changes of both these sorts tend to produce higher initial prices and
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thus higher prices at any given level of total reserves. These results are thus
consistent with the usual notion that increases in concentration worsen market
performance, with the problem here being excessive conservation of the resource.
Both these Propositions depend on the equal cost assumption, under which
the level of reserves provides a natural, exogenous measure of firm size. The
association between concentration and market performance in the static Cournot
theory is of a rather different sort. Rader (1972, pp. 270-3), for instance,
shows that the H index of concentration (equal to the sum of squared market shares)
relates market demand elasticity to the percentage markup over (an average across
the firms of) marginal cost. But in that model, market shares are endogenously
determined as a function of marginal costs; H is thus logically endogenous. If
all firms have equal costs in the Cournot structure, all will have equal market
shr-es, In natural resource markets, even with equal costs, market shares vary
over time if reserve holdings are unequal, so that reserve holdings provide the
only reasonable basis for judgements about concentration. If costs differ, how-
ever, it seems apparent that ny measure of concentration that relates to pric-
ing behavior must reflect both costs and reserve holdings, but it is not yet clear
to us how any such measure might be constructed,
IIT, Unequal costs
We now allow both costs and reserve levels to differ among firms. Let us
order fims so that C1 < C2 < ... < CN, with at least one of the inequalities strict.
We first investigate whether or not firms with different Ci produce simultaneously
in equilibrium.
If production were efficient, in the sense that the discounted cost of pro-
ducing the actual total output stream, Q(t), were minimized, this could not occur.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the Ci are all different. Then it is reasonably
well-known that as long as the rate of interest is positive, efficiency requires
exploiting only firm 's reserves until they are exhausted at time T1, then ex-
11
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ploiting only firms 2's reserves until some later time T2, and so on. It is ne-
ver efficient to produce from any but the lowest cost currently available reserves;
see Solow (1974) for a discussion. To see what drives this, suppose that extrac-
tion of a small amount, dq, of I were postponed from t to t2, where t < T1 < t2,
with the same amount of 12 extracted at t rather than at t2. The change in the
present value of cost is then
dq{e tl(C2-C1) + r 2C1-C2)} = dq{e tl(C2-C1)[-er(t2 t)]} > O.
Under monopoly, with all reserves in the hands of a single firm, discounted costs
are minimized, and reserves with different costs are not simultaneously exploited.
Under competition, with many small firms operating at each cost level, production
is also efficient.
But under oligopoly, efficient exploitation is impossible because equilibrium
must involve periods during which reserves with different costs are simultaneously
exploited. To show this, let us first note that the qi(t) are continuous in any
oligopoly equilibrium along with (from Proposition 1) P(t) and Q(t). Given con-
tinuity of P(t), continuity of the qi(t) follows directly from conditions (la)
and (lb). Now assume the contrary: suppose oligopoly equilibrium output path (t)
is produced efficiently. Suppose there are N firms with unit cost equal to C1
and N2 with unit cost equal to C2. By the assumption of efficiency, there must
be a time T1 such that all firms in the first group cease production at T and
all firms in the second group start at that time. By the continuity of the qi(t),
however, this must mean that Q(t) approaches zero as t approaches T1 from eithcr
above or below. This means that price falls after T1, and that is impossible.
The only way that Q(t) can be kept smooth at T with a shift of all production
from firms in the low-cost group to those in the next higher cost group would be
for some of the qi(t) to be discontinuous. But, given the continuity of P(t),
III
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conditions (1) rule out the discontinuous change in discounted marginal revenue
that would result. We have thus established
Proposition 5 If Ci P Cj for some i and j, the discounted cost
of producing the equilibrium total output stream, Q(t), is not
minimized, because firms with different costs are simultaneously
producing at some times.
This inefficiency result is the intertemporal analog of the standard finding
of inefficiency in asymmetric static Cournot oligopoly; see Schmalensee (1976b)
for a simple example. In that context, efficiency requires equating marginal costs
of all plants operated at any time, but only in symmetric cases does noncoopera-
tive behavior produce this result. These inefficiency results indicate that to
think of oligopolistic markets as intermediate between monopoly and competition in
all respects is to overlook potentially important qualitative differences.
A number of important properties of equilibria when costs are unequal are
given by Propositions 1 and 2. It turns out to be difficult to say much more. In
particular, many of the properties of equilibria with equal costs do not generalize.
In order to illustrate the variety of possible outcomes when costs differ, the
rest of this section is devoted to establishing and discussing
Proposition 6 If Ci > C for some i and j, then in noncooperative
equilibrium it is possible that (a) some firms do not begin produc-
tion at time zero, (b) firm i's output is greater than firm j's at
some times and less at others, and (c) production inefficiency is
sufficiently severe that firm i's reserves are exhausted before firm
I's.
We argue for the first possibility in general terms; the second and third are il-
lustrated by a simple example.
Suppose there is initially only one firm on the market: firm 1 with unit
cost C1 and reserves I1. Acting as a monopolist, that firm would choose price
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path Pm(t). Now add a second firm to the market, with cost C2 between P (0)
and F and reserves I2 less than I1. Let P (t) be the noncooperative duopoly
equilibrium price trajectory, It is clear that by making C2 sufficiently close
to F and 12 sufficiently small relative to I1, P (O) can be made to be below C2.
But this means that firm 2 must wait until price has risen (a finite distance)
above C2 before it begins production. (Recall that q2(t) must then rise contin-
uously from zero; it cannot jump to a positive value.) There is nothing patholo-
gical about such behavior, of course. Inefficiency arises only because both firms
produce for some time, not because firm 2 waits,
At any instant, conditions (la) and (lb) describe a Cournot equilibrium in
the qi' based on unit costs equal to (Ci+Xie ) C. It follows from condition
(la) that qi > q if and only if C! < C. When the Ci are all equal, the rankings
of the C' cannot switch over time, and, as Proposition 4 establishes, the rankings
of the qi cannot change either, But if the Ci are not equal, it would appear
possible for (C - C), and thus (qi-qj), to switch sign once before T for some i
and j. To show that appearances are not deceiving in this case and to establish
part (c) of Proposition 6, we turn to an example.
Suppose N = 2, 0 < C <:C 2 < F, and demand: is linear with P(Q) 8 F - aQ. With
this demand structure, P = (F+2C1)/3. Let P = (F-C1)/2, and assume C2 < C1 + P.
Then it is straightforward to show from conditions (1) that if P > P0 and firm 1
Ifirm 2] is acting as a monopolist, (P-C2)[(P-C 1)] is growing at a rate less than r.
This means that if P < P F and either firm is producing, the other will rational-
ly elect to produce also, f F < 7C1, it follows that P < P so that both firms
will begin production at time zero because P will always exceed P0 in equilibrium
(from Proposition 1),
At any time when both firms are producing, conditions (la) can be written as
III
dl F -C 1 =i et +2aq +aq2,
d2 F - C2 = X2ert + aq + 2aq2
Let s2 = q2/Q, the high-cost firm's share of total output, By solving the two
equations above for s2, differentiating, and manipulating the result, one obtains
(8a) s2 - [r(dl + d2)/3aQ][s2 - s], where
(8b) s = (2d2 - d1)/(dl + d2).
It is clear that s2 = s* is an unstable node of (8a). If s2 begins above s, s2
increases and reaches unity in finite time; if s2(0)< s, s2 declines with time
and reaches zero in finite time. Holding C fixed, s is a decreasing function
of C2; it is easy to show that C2 > C1 implies s < 1/2.
In order to establish part (b) of Proposition 6, it must be shown that equil-
ibria exist in which s2(t) takes on values greater than and lss than 1/2. Suppose
we have s < I2/I < 1/2. Then if s2(0) s*, firm 2's share of production at each
instant will be less than its share of total reserves. Similarly, if s2(0)> 1/2,
q2/Q exceeds I2/I at all times. Thus, in order to meet the reserve constraint,
s2(0) must be between s and 1/2, so that s2(t) is below 1/2 for a finite time and
above 1/2 thereafter, and the proof is complete.
This example illustrates the difficulty, discussed at the end of Section II,
of measuring concentration in a sensible way in this sort of market. In the pre-
ceding paragraph, firm 2 has higher costs and lower reserves then firm 1, but after
a finite period of time its output comes to exceed that of firm 1. Indeed, since
s2 goes to unity, firm 2 is a monopolist for the latter part of the resource mar-
ket's- existence.
Part (c) of Proposition 6 is established by showing that equilibrium may in-
volve s > s2(0), since then s2 goes to zero in finite time, and this means that
firm 2 exhausts its reserves while firm 1 is still producing at a positive rate,
(We noted above that if this happens and if C1 and C2 are close enough together,
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condition (lb) is satisfied thereafter for firm 2.) Suppose 0 < I2/I < s.
If s2(0) exceeds s, it follows that q2/Q always exceeds I2/I. But this is
impossible, so that s(0) must be less than s (and greater than I2/I). Firm
2, the high-cost firm, then exhausts first, and the proof of Proposition 6 is
complete.
Notice that in this example, as in general, the patterns described by (b)
and (c) of that Proposition cannot occur when C1 = C2. Then s = 1/2, (b) is
impossible because 2/I cannot be between s and 1/2, and (c) is impossible be-
cuase there is no high-cost firm. The example explored here suggests that these
patterns are, at least, more likely when the higher-cost firm has the smaller re-
serves. Moreover, (b) may be more likely when reserve differences are moderate
relative to cost differences, while (c) may require reserve differences that are
substantial relative to cost differences, Whether these features of this example
hold in general is not known, however. Finally, it is worth noting that while
exhaustion of high-cost reserves before low-cost reserves is a particularly vivid
manifestation of production inefficiency, we know of nothing that indicates that
it signals especially severe waste in any quantitative sense.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
It will first be shown that conditions (1) imply (a) - (d) directly.
A fixed-point argument using the Ai is then used to establish the exis-
tence of equilibrium, and (e) and (f) are proven in te course of that
demonstration.
To prove (a), suppose the contrary. First, suppose that Q(t) jumps to
zero at some t'. From (la) and (lb) in the text, this would involve a dis-
continuous increase in the net marginal revenue of all firms. In the face
of such a jump, all firms operating just before t' would have an incentive
to delay some production. Thus Q(t) cannot jump to zero in equilibrium.
Second, suppose that Q(t) declines smoothly to zero at some time t' before
T. This means that Q(t") is positive for some t" > t'. Thus for at least
one firm, conditions (1) imply
-rt' -rt"
e IF -[C1 i = e [P - aqi - Ci].
But since t" > t' and (P - aqi) < F, this is clearly not possible. Thus Q(t)
cannot jump to zero and cannot decline to zero before T. It follows that
Q(t) > 0 for 0 < t < T, as was to be shown, and that Q(t) declines smoothly
to zero as t approaches T.
It follows also that equation (2) holds until time T, since m > 1. Adding
conditions (la) for operating firms, it is easily seen that the numerator on the
right of (2) equals rmEe r t , where X is the average of the i for the operating
firms. If X = 0 at any instant, price will be constant forever afterwards, as
(lb) makes it clear that no entry will ever occur. But total production must
then eventually come to exceed total reserves for all operating firms, so this
is impossible. It is clear from (lb) that if (Ci+Xiert) exceeds F, firm i will
not produce. If Ai > 0, this must occur in finite time. If any of the i are
zero, it then follows that the corresponding firms will be alone in the market
II
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after finite time. But we just showed that this implied that those firms
would produce constant qi forever after, violating (c), so that i cannot
be zero for any i in equilibrium, establishing (b) of the Proposition. The
argument just above then establishes (c), and (d) follows from (lc) in the
text.
Let X be a vector of the N Xi, and let A be the set of all X such that
< i < (F-Ci). This set is clearly compact and convex. We construct a con-
tinuous function y mapping A into itself. By the Brouwer fixed point theorem,
this function must have a fixed point, a vector X* such that X* = y(X*). The
function y is defined so that any such fixed point corresponds to an equilibrium
satisfying conditions (1).
The first step is to obtain the path P(t) satisfying (la) and (lb) for any
XcA. Let us define
(Al) Zi(P,Xiert) = max[O, P-Ci-Xiert], i =1,...,N.
These functions are continuous, but not differentiable when P = Ci + X ie t
PC(t). Next define the continuous function (P,Xert):i
N
(A2) (P,Xert) Z Zi (P,Xiert) - a(P)Q(P).
i=l
It is apparent that ~ is everywhere continuous, though it is not differentiable
when P Pc for any i. Comparing equations (1) in the text, it is clear thati
Zi is positive in equilibrium if and only if firm i is producing, and
O[P(t),Xe t ] = 0 for all t.
For given X, P, and t, let m be the number of positive Zi. If P = F,
Q(F) 0 implies that no matter what m is, (F,Xer t) > 0. Now suppose P = P,
defined in assumption (D.3) in the text. If m = 0 at this price, ~ = -aQ < 0.
If m > 0, (Al) and (A2) imply
(P,Xert) = m{P[1-(l/mE)] - C - Xert},(A3)
III
-18-
where C and X are the averages of the Ci and i, respectively, for firms with
positive Zi . When P P,
P[1-(l/mE)] < P{1-[l/NE(P)]} = min C < C,
so that (P,Xert ) < 0 by (A3). Because 4 is continuous, there thus exists a
scalar Pee[,F] such that 4[Pe,Xert]=0.
Now let us show that pe thus defined is unique. As long as P Pc for
all i, the derivative a/aP exists and satisfies
(A4) a4/aP m + 1 - a'Q > m[l-(l/mE)] = [+C+Xe rt]/P,
from (3) in the text and (A3) above. It follows that if [Pi,Xert] $ 0,
i = 1,...,N, then a3/aP is positive whenever - 0, and e is unique. Suppose,
then that [P,Xer] = 0 for some i. From the first equality in (A4), this
means that /aP increases discontinuously at a point which 4 = 0 as m in-
creases by one. If this derivative is positive in the limits as P approaches
PC from above and below, the continuity of establishes that is increasing
1
for all P in a neighborhood of e, and uniqueness still holds. But (3¢/UP) can-
not be negative in the limit as P approaches Pi from below, since (A4) indi-
cates that cannot decline to zero as P increases. Since (/aP) increases
at P, it cannot be negative in the limit as P approaches Pi from above either,at Pin
so that it must be positive in both limits. There is thus one and only one P
that solves (P,Xe ) = 0 for any XeA and t > 0. This equation thus defines
an implicit function Pe(Xert), with range contained in the interval [,F].
We must next demonstrate that this function is continuous. Suppose the
contrary: suppose there exist sequences {ti} and { i}, such that ti> 0 and
XieA for all i and such that the sequence {Xiert I approaches X er with
lim P e[krt] - Pe[Xerte ] + K, where K O. By construction, [Pe(i e rt
Xert i = 0 for all i, so that by the continuity of 4,
-19-
eh i rti i rt i = e O rt O rt0
lim e ),X e i =[P ( e )+K, e J = 0.
0 rt
But this implies that there are two P's that solve [P,X e ]=0, and we
showed above that this could not occur. The continuity of pe is thus estab-
lished by contradiction. Since e depends on Xert, it follows that in equili-
brium, P(t) is continuous, establishing part (e) of the Proposition.
We can now define the function y on which the existence proof turns. Pick
a vector AsA. For all t > 0, compute P(t) = Pe(Xer ). Then use (la) in the
text and (Al) to obtain for all i and t,
^ rt
qi(t;X) = Zi[P(t),Xie ]/a[P(t)].
Integration then yields total resource production for each firm implied by 
and conditions (la) and (lb):
00 A
Ii(X) = qi(t;X)dt, i = 1,...,N.
6
It follows from the continuity of e that the Ii are continuous. Next, define
(A5) Di(A) = max[Ii(X)-Ii,Ol, and Ei(X) = max[Ii-Ii(X),O], i = 1,...,N.
The components of the vector-valued function y are then given by
(A6) Yi(X) = X + (F-Ci-Xi)fl-exp[-Di(A)1} - (Xi){l-exp[-Ei(X)]},
This continuous function takes points in the compact, convex set A into points
in that same set, so by the Brouwer theorem it has at least one fixed point,
one vector X*cA such that yi(X*) = X* for i = 1,...,N.
By construction, conditions (la) and (lb) are satisfied by the qi(t;X*).
To prove that fixed points of y are equilibria, it remains only to show that
conditions (lc) are satisfied. The first inequalities in (lc) are satisfied
by the definition of A. Suppose that Di > O at a fixed point for some i, so
that Ii exceeds Ii and the inequality constraint on total production in (lc)
III
is violated. Since Ei must then be zero for that i by (A5), it follows that
ki = F - C But since P can never exceed F, it follows from (A1) that Zi is
A A A
never positive, thus qi is never positive, Ii is zero, and Ii cannot exceed Ii.
This contradicts the as, umption Di > 0, so Di must eq'ual zero at a fixed point
and the reserve inequality constraints in (lc) are satisfied at fixed points
of y. Now suppose that Ei > 0 at a fixed point. As above, this implies that
total production falls short of total reserves for firm i with X = 0. This
would not violate (lc). But the argument for (b) of the Proposition shows
that if Xi = 0, firm i's total production as given by (la) and (lb) in the
text is infinite. Thus Ei cannot be positive at a fixed point. At such
points, as at equilibria, Ei Di = 0; initial reserves are exactly used up
by all firms. The proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The markets considered by Pindyck (1977, 1978a), for instance, are
either actually or potentially (in the event of cartel breakdown)
oligopolistic.
2. Most of the assumptions that follow have been relaxed somewhere in the
literature, though usually only one at a time and never in the context
of an oligopoly model. In addition to the papers cited thus far, see
Schmalensee (1976a), Loury (1978), Pindyck (1978b), Arrow (1979), and
the references they cite.
3. The validity of this equilibrium concept under conditions of incomplete
futures markets with a dominant firm has been explored by Lewis and
Schmalensee (1978, 1979). Under that structure, the ability accurately
to estimate the current output of the dominant firm may serve to support
an equilibrium of this basic type.
4. Dots indicate time derivatives.
5. In unpublished work, Stephen Salant has independently developed a fixed-
point argument like that used in the Appendix and employed it both to
study the existence of equilibrium and to compute equilibria under more
general assumptions than those made here.
6. Salant (1976, Appendix B) notes the latter two points in a special case
of this model with only two firm types.
7. In fact, we have been able to demonstrate uniqueness without the assump-
tion of equal reserves (but using the assumption of equal costs) by using
the same sort of proof by contradiction employed to show uniqueness in a
dominant extractor model in Lewis and Schmalensee (1979). As the proof
is somewhat tedious and the result neither very surprising nor useful for
any of our comparative statements, we do not present it.
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8. By setting qi = Q/N, conditions (5) can be defined for non-integer
N. The proof of (e) and (f) in Lewis and Scthnalensee (1979) relies
on demand being sufficiently smooth that Q(t) is a differentiable
function. of N for 11 t.
9. On the relations between competition and monopoly in natural resource
markets under these demand assumptions, see Weinstein and Zeckhauser
(1975), Stiglitz (1976), and Sweeney (1977). On the effects of chang-
ing N in static Cournot models, see Okuguchi (1973).
10. See, for instance, Hart (1975) and the references he cites.
31. This illustrates, in an inverse fashion, the discussion just below
Proposition 6: if cost differences are minor, there is a presumption
that all firms will begin production at the same time.
